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How SCE established the global success in the video game industry
－The value chain strategy and integrated-based production system－
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This paper deals with how SCE (Sony Computer Entertainment) successfully launched PS (PlayStation) without
any relevant experiences in the T.V. video game business. SCE dominated the T.V. video game market worldwide
a couple of years after PS was released in Japan. Delineating the fierce competition in the T.V. video game
industry, the analysis delves into the value chain of organizations inherent in SCE and the integrated architecture
of production systems adopted by SCE. The miraculous success of SCE presents a model for strategic reconsideration
of international management systems and behavioral patterns of multinational corporations.
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Introduction
This paper deals with the global success of PS
(PlayStation) in the T.V. video game industry with
special reference to the value chain strategy and
integrated-based production system in SCE (Sony
Computer Entertainment) The paper investigates that
how the value chain and the integrated-based
production system could be successfully carried out
to launch PS despite adverse circumstances brought
on by formidable rivals.
SCE released PS on December 3, 1993. Since then,
the predominance of Nintendo was rapidly disrupted
and overwhelmed by the inroads of PS into the game
industry. No one could predicts that SCE would
destroy the Nintendo’s entrenched dominance in the
T.V. video game industry in a few years. SCE
successfully outmaneuvered Nintendo and SEGA
Enterprises,(1) pushing them into their own niche
segmentation, thus far undermining the business
models encompassing the whole video game market.
Furthermore, SCE expanded its market share in the
T.V. video game industry worldwide. It took only three
years for SCE to take more than 50 % of the total
market share in the U.S. and Europe.
This was an indisputable victory for SCE, which
concentrated every management resource on in-house
company capabilities. The paper shows that no global
success of SCE would have been achieved without
both the centripetal coherences of business which were
created inside the company and an entrepreneurial
mindset of management.
Ⅰ  Towards a Strategic Breakthrough
1  Advent of the Nintendo Empire
The historical formation of Japanese T.V. video
game market can be dated back to the early 1980s.(2)
Epoch, the famous Japanese toy company released
“Cassette Vision” on August 1981. Micro Processing
Unit (MPU) was not equipped with this machine.
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However, it was the first hit T.V. video game machine
in Japan. This machine was run by three major
instruments: the console, the cartridge and the control
stick.(3) The historical significance of “Cassette
Vision” was that toy makers and hi-tech manufacturers
began to recognize computer-game machines to be
lucrative business.
During a short period from 1981 to 1983, 11
companies entered the Japanese T.V. video game
market. While VCS (Video Computer System) of the
Atari Corporation of the U.S, Odyssey of U.S. Phillips,
Max Machine of Commodore Japan, and Intellivison
of Mattel (See Table 1: T.V. Video Game Hardware
in the First Half of the 1980s) were exported to Japan,
the rest of hardware was manufactured by Japanese
companies. The market was in highly intensified
competition.
On July 15, 1983, Nintendo launched “Family
Computer”. This machine overwhelmed other video
game machines and drove them out of the market in a
short period of only two years. There were three
reasons why Nintendo so tactfully outflanked other
game companies in the fierce competition of the T.V.
video game market.
The first reason for Nintendo success is that the
price of “Family Computer” was much more
affordably set at 14,800 yen, which was almost less
than half the price of consoles of other companies. It
was apparent that Family Computer was sold under
cost. However, Nintendo anticipated that low pricing
would produce large and strong patronage from
consumers. Nintendo was in a forerunner of relational
marketing, whose aim was to establish a long term
relationship with consumers. The second reason is that
“Family Computer” had 52 colors on the graphic
function at the maximum basis. The console of Family
Computer had the same 8 bit MPU as other machines,
but Family Computer mesmerized youngsters and
adolescents with the exciting features of colorful
characters moving on the T.V. screen, which could
Table 1
T.V. Video Game Hardware in the First Half of the 1980s
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not be enjoyed by other machines. The third reason
was that more game software was released for “Family
Computer”, compared with that of the Nintendo’s
competitors.
Sales of Family Computer were substantially
proportionate with the variety of video software that
was compatible with this machine. Nintendo put a high
premium on dynamic, thrilling and entertaining
attributes underlying video games. The more the
accompanying game software was sold, the more
Family Computer was sold, not vice versa. The video
game software that was sold well came to be called
killer soft, because the sales of consoles depended on
the quality of video game software. (See Table 2 :
Million Seller Software)
Nintendo was not snared in the management
mistake called “Atari Shock”, which led to mass
production of inferior hardware and vide game
software.(4)  In order to avoid Atari Shock, Nintendo
patented “Family Computer” and also registered
compatible video game software under the trademark
of Nintendo. In doing so, other companies vying with
Nintendo were not allowed to produce clone machines
identical to “Family Computer”, and they were not
permitted to create the same game software as those
made by Nintendo and third parties which contracted
with Nintendo.
The advent of Nintendo and the downfall of other
game companies gave good lessons for the video game
industry: the increase in the sales of consoles was to a
great extent correlated with the quality of software
which enhances excitement of players: the format
holder should not change the price of a consol so
frequently before it was released that the price change
may incur a bad reputation; consoles which were
regarded as clumsy and complicated in terms of
handling were doomed to be kicked out of the market
in a couple of months after they were merchandised.
It does not go too far to say that the sales volume of
brand new products in the game industry could be
Table 2
Million Seller Software
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easily predicted before they were released. Namely,
reputation was pre-determined.
Two years after “Family Computer” was launched
in the market, the significant  killer software rolled
out boosting the market share of Nintendo. “Super
Mario Brothers”, which was originally developed in
Nintendo, was a big hit in the market. Subsequently,
“Dragon Quest”, which was produced by Enix, was a
great success in 1986. In 1988, “Dragon Quest III”
brought a spree to Japanese game players. This fad
was called “Drakue Gensho”（ドラクエ現象）in
Japan because video game fans were so keen to get
this game software that they did not mind standing in
a long line for a long time at game shops. Sales of
“Family Computer” totaled about 18 million in Japan,
and 31 million in the U.S. was recorded since the first
release in 1985. “Family Computer” established a de
facto standard in the video game industry in that most
format holders and third parties were completely
susceptible to business trends initiated by Nintendo.
More importantly, “Family Computer” came to be
called “Fami-Kon” among Japanese. The name “Fami-
Kon” became so prevalent in Japan that people
confusingly tended to call even consoles produced by
other companies “Fami-Kon”. This was the victorious
moment when Nintendo rendered Fami-Kon an
unbeaten national brand in the game industry.
2  The impregnable System
On November 21, 1990, Nintendo released “Super
Family Computer” with 16 bit MPU. Concurrently,
the popular game software “Super Mario Brothers”
and “F-ZERO” which was associated with F1 Grand
Prix, were launched for this brand new machine. It
was announced that on only that day of the release,
more than 300,000 consoles were sold. Subsequently,
“Final Fantasy” and “Legend of Zelda”, which were
promisingly categorized as killer soft, were released.
About 1 million consoles were sold in one year after
“Super Family Computer” was released.
Nintendo wielded control over the T.V. video game
market overseas as well as in Japan for ten years until
the release of PS. There was no competition for
Nintendo any more. Under such a nearly monopolistic
condition, the strict regulations were imposed upon
the third parties at the company’s discretion. These
regulations were as follows: production expenditure
must be paid to Nintendo in advance: no more than
three video games were allowed to be produced in a
year; and inspection was made under Nintendo quality
control before merchandise was made. Even under
such severe controls, no third parties cancelled
contracts with Nintendo because they were able to gain
big profits if their video game won popularity in the
market.
During the heyday of Nintendo, the company
contracted with more than 140 third parties
domestically as well as abroad. An economic
magazine described the overwhelming dominance of
Nintendo upon the game industry in the following way:
“Nintendo enjoys a closed architecture system similar
to the way in which IBM did not permit programmers
of other companies to make access to its OS. In 1993,
Nintendo won 166.2 billion yen in operation profit.”(5)
It goes without saying that third parties, wholesalers,
and game shops were made to be subservient to
Nintendo, the gigantic format holder.
3  Birth of SCE
In the latter half of the 1980s, Sony and Nintendo
launched a joint project to develop a new video game
named PS-X. Both companies aimed to replace ROM-
Cassette with CD-ROM. However, Nintendo suddenly
rescinded this project because it tried to affiliate itself
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with Philips Corporation, Holland, taking into
consideration that Sony would claim the license of
CD-ROM. Instead, Nintendo planned to make a big
profit in the same way that huge royalties were paid
by third parties through the production of ROM-
Cassette linked to Family Computer and Super Family
Computer. However, the collaboration with Philips
was never accomplished. It was reported that Nintendo
stuck to the development of a next generation console
in which ROM-Cassette was equipped. Hiroshi
Yamauchi, the CEO of Nintendo said at the time when
the technological alliance was abolished, “a large
quantity of vide game software never meets the
entertainment needs of players”(6) or “Playing video
games is totally different from watching movies in
the context of entertainment”.(7) However, it turned
out these statements were his wishful thinking.
This unexpected cancellation led to the
establishment of Sony Computer Entertainment, which
was financed jointly by Sony and SME (Sony Music
Entertainment) on November 16, 1993. The CEO was
Toshio Ozawa, the chairperson of SME. Senior
executive vice presidents were Shigeo Maruyama from
SME and Teruhisa Tokunaka from the headquarters.
Ken Kutaragi was appointed as a general manager of
the R&D division of SCE. The new company was
ready to make a strategic breakthrough in the arena of
the very competitive T.V. video game industry. (See
Chart 1: Strategic Breakthrough of SCE)
4  In Pursuit of CD-ROM Development
Even after the sudden cancellation of the Sony-
Nintendo project, which gave a big blow to the
engineers of Sony who were absorbed in the
development of CD-ROM in collaboration with
Nintendo, these engineers were not discouraged at the
setback. On the contrary, they were firmly determined
to carry out and accomplish the project by themselves.
There were three reasons that drove the engineers to
get involved in commercialization of CD-ROM.
The first was that the production cost of CD-ROM
was nearly by half lower than that of ROM-Cassette.
The second was that the production lead time of CD-
ROM is by two times shorter than that of ROM-
Cassette. The third was that MPU of 640 bytes was
equipped in CD-ROM, compared with ROM- Cassette
which holds 8 bytes of MPU. This means that CD-
ROM equipped soft ware enabled game programmers
to create contents eighty times as powerful as that of
ROM-Cassette. This technological progress motivated
programmers to get engaged in producing more
dynamic works. Moreover, it presented thrilling
expectations to players who had been waiting for more
complicated and exciting video game software.
5  Creating a New Marketing Channel
When SCE was established on November 16, 1993,
Nintendo had very strong marketing channels with
about 25,000 toy shops all over Japan. It seemed that
no companies other than Nintendo could establish any
effective marketing channels in this industry. In fact,
Chart 1
Strategic breakthrough of SCE
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by influencing its predominance on the industry,
Nintendo put strict surveillance on these shop owners
in order to keep them from dealing in products from
other vying companies. When Nintendo found that
these shop owners violated the stipulations, the
contract was unconditionally and unilaterally
cancelled.
The shipment of new video games was made from
third parties through wholesalers to game shops under
the severe and meticulous control of Nintendo.
However, this closed system was bottlenecked in that
no matter how promising new game software may be,
no one could predict the exact demand. Many
influential wholesalers tended to buy up game software
in advance which was expected to be in high demand
whereas they were prone to beat down the price of
unpopular game software. Thus, the video game
market trading system was becoming speculative and
warped.
SCE cashed in on the stagnant situations of the
T.V. video game market. SCE followed the statements
made by William H. Davidow. “A new device or
invention will never become a product without proper
distribution. The device itself may have the potential
to address the needs of many customers, but without
specialists to put it in the hands of those customer
segments, it will not succeed.”(8) SCE cautiously
created its own sales channels. The marketing strategy
was deployed in the following ways: first, SCE directly
supplied their products to sales shop, not through
wholesalers; second, on-line business was introduced:
CD-ROM based game software enabled the company
to make an on-line production system which was
designed to prevent dead inventory on video software
games and effectively shorten the time of shipment.
In doing so, SCE solved chronic problems of the
T.V. vide game industry: timely producing game
software, keeping a stable supply of game software to
shops, and  abolishing pre-purchase of game software
from third party companies.
6  Alliance with Third Parties
In the few months before PS was released, SCE
had no game soft ware. The company strove to contract
with leading third parties which were capable of
producing killer software. However, these companies
were so reluctant to make contract with SCE because
they did not regard SCE as a format holder for a
promising good business partner. In the game industry,
video software with good sales is called “killer soft”.
SCE wanted to affiliate itself with third parties that
produced good qualities of software. The rationale was
very clear: the sales amount of consoles evidently
correlated with that of game software. This alignment
with third parties was an imperative on the grounds
that SCE could outmaneuver Nintendo and SEGA
confronting the fledging game company.
As shown in Table 3, “Dragon Quest” and “Final
Fantasy” are outstanding killer software. The sales
amounts of these two game soft series totaled more
than 10 million. It was obvious that killer software
contributed to the prosperity of Nintendo.
There was an interesting episode in which one of
the major third parties told SCE that the company
would want to make a contract with SCE after the
total sales of consoles produced in SCE exceeded over
three million.(9)
Despite theses adverse circumstances, SCE
succeeded in contracting with Namco, one of the major
third parties, while Namco cancelled its contract with
Nintendo. This was partly because Namco appreciated
the innovative functions of PS, and partly because
Namco was in contract trouble with Nintendo. The
game software “Ridge Racer”, issued by Namco, was
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the first blockbuster for SCE. Once Namco made a
contract with SCE, many other third parties followed
suit.
Also, it should be noted that SCE created new third
parties by itself. In particular, SME helped SCE build
this tactical plan. Before SCE took part in the T.V.
video game industry, small companies which did not
have sufficient production budgets could not embark
on software business. In order to make these
companies access the lucrative business opportunity,
SCE introduced the same audition system as did SME
adopted in the 1960s when a few companies dominated
the Japanese music industry.(10) If the concept of
software was accepted by the audition of SCE, it
financed these companies which would become
successful third parties for SCE.
7  Exploiting Potential Markets
Before PS was marketed in the game industry, there
was a clear distinction between Nintendo and Sega in
terms of market segmentation. Nintendo focused
marketing strategy on the kids in elementary and junior
high school, whereas Sega concentrated the marketing
target on over 16-year-old boys from high school
students to salaried workers in the late 20s who often
played arcade game machines.
At first glance, there was no leeway for SCE to
create a marketing opportunity in the existing saturated
market. For that reason, SCE aimed to exploit a new
marketing niche such as female consumers, middle-
aged persons, and people who were interested in
playing games, though not always hooked on the video
games. Correspondingly, whether the quality of game
software may be good or bad, SCE had to brace for
numerous publications, compared with those of
Nintendo and SEGA.
This strategy was correct. Nintendo and SEGA
faced a dilemma partly because the two companies
were shackled by the strong patronage of existing
consumers who supported their own consoles, and
partly because they avoided running the risk of
expanding the marketing segmentations. In other
words, under the well-established marketing
segmentations, both companies could not change a
marketing strategic position shored up by enormous
game fans infatuated with their video games.
Consequently, SCE was capable of disrupting the
vested market share of Nintendo and Sega.
Interestingly enough, their dilemma was almost the
same case as the so-called “Innovator’s Dilemma” put
forward by C. Christensen. According to Christensen,
“Disruptive technologies bring to a market a very
different value proposition than had been available
previously”. (11) “Hence, most companies with a
practiced discipline of listening to their costumers and
identifying new products that promise greater
profitability and growth are rarely able to build a case
for investing in disruptive technologies until it is too
late”. (12) Therefore, it also can be observed that
Nintendo and Sega were trapped in the “Innovator’s
Dilemma”. Nintendo and Sega were too preoccupied
with early success to change the existing strategy.
8  X day of Release
SCE cautiously planned to decide the day when
PS should be released in the market. This was a very
strategic decision for the company because SCE
looked for the best time to capitalize on an opportunity
to purchase a lump of semi-conductors from suppliers
at large discount.
Put differently, SCE was probing for a downturn
in the “Silicon Cycle”, which means that there is a
fluctuating tendency for the price of chip to plummet
when silicon chips were overproduced in the semi-
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conductor companies or were oversupplied in the IT
market.
In this connection, in 1983 Nintendo also took the
same tactics with respect to the release of “Family
Computer” as did SCE. Nintendo circumspectly
predicted the bottom line of the Silicon Cycle.
Nintendo was favorably able to negotiate with semi-
conductor companies to discount chips with bulk
buying. This was the most crucial moment for
Nintendo to outflank its rivalry and develop the
company.
The same goes for the grave failure of SEGA in
releasing Dream Cast. SEGA underwent short supply
of MPUs just before Dream Cast was rolled out.
Management predicted over one million sales, but the
sales amount reached only half a million in a year due
to shortage of stock. The miscalculation contributed
to the end of production of Dream Cast.
9  Advertising Tactics(13)
SEGA and Nintendo produced their own software
while they released hardware. As far as SEGA and
Nintendo are concerned, it is conceivable that software
must be congruent and integrated with hardware in
terms of the brand image of the company. The
hardware and software produced by SEGA reflects
computer-friendly games in which handling skills are
required, whereas those by Nintendo are like safe toys
youngsters can easily play.
However, SCE as a format folder had no software.
This means that SCE could do away with formalities
to match the image of hardware with that of software.
SCE aimed to target potential marginal players who
are not preoccupied with T.V. video games, and who
don’t belong to youngsters or adolescents. It can be
said that SCE tried to cover all generations regardless
of gender. This is why middle aged men and women
playing PS were frequently observed on T.V.
commercials presented by SCE. For that reason, the
titles of software issued by SCE are divergent,
inconsistent and incoherent in the context of a total
library of software.
More importantly, the software that had good sales
prospects was broadcast on the T.V. for a long time to
keep the name of software familiar to T.V. viewers.
This differed from the advertising ways of SEGA and
Nintendo which made short-term T.V. sales pitches
for only forthcoming software. SCE presupposed that
such persistent T.V. sales pitches would make viewers
want to buy the ongoing advertised software on
impulse when they visited toy shops.
It should also be noted that SCE never put its name
on the screen when software of third parties was
broadcast on T.V. while SEGA and Nintendo put their
own company names on the screen when software in
such cases. Two reasons why SCE did not put the name
of its company on T.V. screen may be that: SCE is
not so familiar to T.V. viewers that its name could be
established for the brand per se; and SCE wanted to
avoid a confusing company image which the multi-
platform system may cause, by simultaneously
televising the company name with the name of the
third party.(14) Instead, SCE introduced its own jingle(15)
which can readily remind viewers of the advertisement
relating to PS just before software of third parties is
substantially advertised on T.V.
Ⅱ  Dynamic Organizational Hinterlands
1  The Key Person of This Project
It was Ken Kutaragi who took full and strong
leadership to implement the P.S. project. He was a
key person who led SCE to succeed in the worldwide
video game war. After he was recruited by Sony in
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1975, he was assigned to the R&D division. His
specialty was digital technology. He became
preoccupied with developing digital instruments.
However, Kutaragi was regarded as a nuisance, a
black sheep or recalcitrant in the organization before
PS was highlighted because his entrepreneurship and
ardent sprit for R&D were always mistaken for defiant
and rebellious attitudes against management. He never
acquiesced to ideas different from his own.
In spite of his strenuous effort to address the
importance of digital products, his ideas were shelved
and remained outlandish in the company at that time
because Sony was dubious of commercializing
products with digital technology. Sony cautiously
avoided running the risk of embarking on businesses
based on IT technology, especially digital ones,
because the company had suffered excruciating
experiences. For example, Sony failed to survive in
the electric calculator market which represented cut
throat competition in the 1970s. The company
eventually retreated from the market despite being the
development forerunner of the electric calculator.
Kutaragi was supposed to be reshuffled to the VTR
division in the middle of the 1980s, but he solicited
help from a senior managing director, explaining that
he was anxious to continue research associated with
digital technology. Fortunately, his request was
granted. In 1985, he was assigned to the Information
Technology Laboratory in Atsugi which is located 50
miles west of Tokyo.
In 1991, not long before when the joint venture
with Nintendo was cancelled, Kutaragi was
determined to materialize new game hardware made
by only Sony itself. It was a sort of in-house venture
enterprise. He persuaded Norio Ohga, Sony Chairman
& CEO to establish a new company for the game
business. It was easily accepted. Subsequently,
Kutaragi involved the CEO of SME, Shigeo
Maruyama and Teruhisa Tokunaka in charge of
corporate laws and M&A in the headquarters. They
had frequent meetings about how to launch a new
project and make it survive in the fiercely competitive
market. A few years later, each of them was appointed
as managing founders of SCE.
2  A Charisma Tradition in Sony
A charisma tradition runs in the history of Sony.
Since the establishment of the company under the
name of Tokyo Tsushin Kogyou in 1946, the company
incessantly pursed to the ever changing organizational
improvements and the founders, Masaru Ibuka and
Akio Morita were entrepreneurs with strong
leadership. This charisma-type leadership was
inherited to the next-generation senior managing
officers such as Kazuo Iwama, Norio Ohga and
Nobuyuki Idei. Ohga and Idei were recruited after the
fame of Sony was established, but both of them
became ones of successive CEOs with the
entrepreneurship stemming from the guinea pig spirit
deeply rooted in the company.
A charismatic-oriented management makes
organizations elastic and resilient, rather than making
them stagnant and static. Organizational reshuffles are
commonly observed in Sony. More importantly, Sony
respects the personnel policy to put the right members
of staff in the right jobs to the extent to which
organizational flexibility can be best optimized.
Under this dynamic company tradition, Kutaragi’s
idea came into being and came to be embodied in the
project despite his opinionated character, which seems
detrimental to typical Japanese managerial climates.
Sony was and is benevolent and magnanimous to
entrepreneurial heretics, to say the least.
In contrast to Sony, the famous and legendary
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Japanese company founders of Matsushita Electric
Industrial Corporation (Kounosuke Matsushita),
Honda Motor (Souichiro Honda) and Daiei (Isao
Nakauchi) had charismatic CEO, but exceptionally
strong leadership was never taken over by successors.
In the case of Daiei, the company had its heyday in
the 1970s－ 1980s. However, it became imbued with
bureaucratic characteristics as the company grew up.
In the 1990s, Daiei was on the verge of bankruptcy
and still struggles to survive even in the 2000s.
3  Philosophy behind Successful Products
Sony has a managerial climate which is
idiosyncratic, compared to other companies in special
relation to R&D. Sony respects “Not Invented Here”
(NIH Syndrome) which the management strongly
believes is crucial to creating entrepreneurial minds
in the company. “Not Invented Here” (16) can be
succinctly described in the following way:“Not
Invented Here Syndrome” is a slightly tongue-in-
cheek name for the tendency of both individual
developers and entire organizations to reject suitable
external solutions to software development problems
in favor of internally-developed solutions.
NIH is deeply embedded in the mindset of
management in Sony in that the company must
produce the products which have never been created
and marketed by other electronics companies.
However, there was a clear tendency for Sony to have
opinionated researchers and engineers. A critic called
such a management policy of Sony a guinea pig spirit.
The reason is that no matter how often the company
may make epoch-making products, they are sooner or
later doomed to be superceded by more innovative
ones produced by other companies in rivalry. This
surely can be applied to Sony. However, the president
of Sony, Ibuka, uncomplainingly accepted this virulent
remark made in the early 1960s at the decade when
the company began to be recognized in the Japanese
industry. He was proud of the guinea pig spirit that
Sony would be sacrificed in the end.
Let us exemplify historic products of Sony since
the company was set up in 1949. The first big hit was
commercialization of the transistor radio (1955), but
most marketers doubted that it could be sold at the
time when it was marketed. Success was legendary
enough to be remembered in the history of postwar-
industry. From the 1970s to the 1980s, Sony
aggressively entered household appliance markets.
However, most projects failed: the portable electric
calculator (1967－ 1975), the work station (1987－
1992), Betamax-VTR (1975－1985) and the personal
computer(1982－ 1992). Sony pulled these products
out of the market because of increasingly fierce
competition, although the company was a pathfinder
for new household electrical appliances.
Whereas the above electrical appliances vanished
in the market, Sony revealed resilient maneuverability
to the market. Walkman, Vaio and WEGA were big
hits. Walkman, which was a music player without a
recorder was launched in 1978, Vaio, which was a
PC was marketed in 1990. And WEGA which was a
T.V. with a flat screen, was marketed in 1996.
Particularly, in the case of product development of
Walkman, the management rarely conducted intensive
market research partly because the novel concept of
new appliance did not exist among potential customers
and partly because management firmly believed that
the market should be exploited by Sony itself.
4  Combination of Ideas with Techno Stock
Sony traditionally respects ideas from engineers
with special reference to market feasibility. If the ideas
are viable in the market, management suggests to
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engineers that they should be embodied in products
which must be unique or have a competitive edge in
the market. Likewise, management inspires the
marketing division to promote products that can
surpass rivals in quality. As one of company founders,
Ibuka once put it, “If Sony makes consumers want to
buy its own creative products, the efforts break into
three stages: the good ideas behind the products
account for 1% of the business success; the creation
of product prototypes, 10%, success in marketing
strategies, 100%.” (17)  This statement typifies a
management philosophy of Sony in weighing feasible
ideas with products and marketability. In particular,
Walkman became a legendary success led by the CEO
of Sony, Akio Morita. While he disparagingly denied
meticulous market surveys obediently following
consumers’ whimsical opinions, he insisted that the
demand should be created from nothing.
Ⅲ  Fierce Competition with Rivalry
1  The Real Rival－ Sega Saturn
Sega-Saturn was the video-game console maker
which substantially competed with PS because both
consoles had 32 bit MPUs and CD-ROM machines
which enabled players to enjoy 3 CG games. Sales of
Sega-Saturn consoles totaled over 1 million in the
market six months after it was launched on November
24, 1994. It was a big hit for SEGA. Sega-Saturn was
quite on par with PS in popularity. The sales
competition with PS was neck and neck. However,
the number of third parties which contracted with SCE
was gradually increasing. Therefore, it was obvious
that the game software produced by SCE outnumbered
those at SEGA.
The production of Sega-Saturn was transferred to
South East Asian countries because of cost reduction
to gain a competitive edge.(18) The price of Sega-Saturn
was reduced to 20,000 yen. However, this tactical
measure was not rewarding. In the U.S and Europe,
SCE continued the price reduction of PS every year
while SEGA sold Sega Saturn bundled with video
game software, which was derogatively construed as
the icing on the cake among competitors. The CEO of
Nintendo, Hiroshi Yamauchi, bitterly criticized the
management strategy of SEGA. “SEGA never realizes
what software is. This company was making
consumers misunderstand that software is given free
when they buy hardware.”(19)
SEGA could not fend off the incessant onslaught
price reduction of PS. SEGA incurred a loss of about
600 million dollars because of overseas underselling
operations. Sega-Saturn eventually went out of
production in 1998. Dreamcast which was a next
generation-console to Sega Saturn, rolled out in 1999.
However, it failed to restore the lost share. SEGA
announced that it had backed out of the console
business on December 2001. Nonetheless, it was
frequently said in the media that SEGA put up a good
fight against SCE though it failed to turn the table.
There are three points in which SCE could beat Sega-
Saturn.
The first is the cost reduction system for PS. SCE
could reduce the number of parts inside of the console
which enabled production cost to be decreased. The
original architecture of PS was designed in light of
cost reduction. The total number of parts in the first
console which was released on December, 1994
amounted to 750, while the number of parts in the
fifth console which was released in November, 1997
was reduced to 450.(20) This efficient cost reduction
gave an opportunity for SCE to reduce the price of
PS. On November 1997, the price was reduced to
18,000 yen. SCE made price change s to PS five times
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in about 3 years since the first roll out.
The second strong point for SCE is that SEGA was
involved in the sales promotion race vying with SCE.
The sales promotion expenses were a kind of bankroll.
SCE made a much better offer for promotion benefits
to third parities than SEGA. SCE successfully lured
third parties because third parties wanted to invest in
development for their game software with sales
promotion expenses from SCE. This marked a
substantial watershed in the end of SCE-SEGA game
warfare. The prosperity of SEGA was in danger.
Eventually, SCE won the contracts with the leading
third parties which supplied game software the
consumers were keen to buy.(21)
The third strong point for SCE is that game
software engineers preferred PS to Sega-Saturn in
terms of producing their games, especially 3CG. In
addition, the architecture of PS was less complicated
and more tractable than that of Sega-Saturn.
2  The End of Nintendo Dominance
Nintendo enjoyed its heyday for ten years until PS
and Sega-Saturn were released in 1984 at the time
when Super Family Computer (Super Fami Kon) was
regarded as old-fashioned hardware. The price was
beaten down and the sales amount plummeted more
sharply than Nintendo had expected. Nintendo was
outflanked by new game hardware of SCE and SEGA.
In 1996, Nintendo released N64 (Nintendo 64)
three years after PS was released. The company was
confident of preventing these two obnoxious
companies from making further inroads into the
market share of the T.V. video game industry.
However, youngsters were seldom infatuated by this
brand new machine with ROM-Cassette. The defense
plan backfired. To make matters worse, a major third
party company, Enix, cancelled to renew a contract
for a supplier to Nintendo. This company produced a
killer software, Dragon Ball Series. Subsequently,
Square, one of the major third parties, canceled to
extend a contract with Nintendo. It was also a big blow
to Nintendo because Square supplied a strong killer
software, Final Fantasy Series, for Nintendo. The
austere control over the third parties by Nintendo
began to crumble.
Under such a severe condition, while Nintendo
made a marketing reform in which Shoshin-Kai（初
心会）was disbanded, the company affiliated itself
with LAWSON running the convenience stores chain
in which N64 and the relevant game software can be
purchased by the computer installed inside the stores.
Despite these strenuous efforts, Nintendo could not
restore market share sufficient enough to dominate
the game industry. Correspondingly, the stock of
Nintendo fell so sharply that its trading was
temporarily suspended in August 1996. This typified
the end of Nintendo’s dominance over the T.V. game
industry.
3  Advertising Offensive
The ratio of advertising expenditure to the total
sales amount for SCE was 13.5% during the period
from 1994 to 1996 while the ratio was 3.9% for SEGA
and 3.5% for Nintendo individually. This means that
SCE spent money on advertisements more than three
times as much than SEGA and Nintendo.(22)
When SCE released PS on December 1994, the
spot commercials were conducted on T.V. However,
SCE did not sponsor any T.V. programs for PS. The
advertisements were more focused on hardware than
on software, whose issued titles counted 19. GRP
(Gross Rating Point)(23) on hardware amounted to
15,344 points, while that of software amounted to
4,226 points. The GRP totaled 15,344 points. The ratio
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of sponsor commercials with spot commercials was
0: 100%. The reason why GRP on software was weak
was that SCE did not have any killer software. The
total count of GRP was relatively low, compared with
Sega Saturn whose GRP totally indicated 18,021
points.
In 1995, SCE advertisements still emphasized
hardware over software in order to make T.V.
audiences remember P.S. This year saw fierce sales
competition between P.S. and Sega Saturn. The GRP
on hardware counted 20,460 points, whereas that of
software numbered 14,895 points. The GRP totaled
35,356 points. The ratio was 57.9% : 42.1%, and the
ratio of sponsor commercials to spot commercials was
3.69% : 96.31%.
On June 1996, Nintendo released N64. This year
was a watershed in the T.V. video game competition.
The GRP on hardware amounted to 11,097 points,
while that of software counted 60,504. The GRP
totaled 71,601 points. The ratio was 15.4% : 84.6%.
The ratio of sponsor commercials with spot
commercials was 15.8% : 84.2%. The content of GRP
changed that year. Advertisements of software were
more emphasized more than hardware. It can be
assumed that SCE understood that the name of PS was
prevalent enough for consumers to distinguish PS from
other consoles.
In 1997, SCE paid strenuous effort to corner SEGA
and Nintendo. The GRP on hardware amounted to
10,725 points, while that of software numbered 88,526
points. The ratio was 10.8% : 89.2%. The GRP totaled
99,251 points. The ratio of sponsor commercials to
spot commercials was 26.5% : 73.5%.
1998 saw SCE win over SEGA and Nintendo. The
fierce competition was substantially over. The total
GRP drastically decreased to 49,517 points. The GRP
on hardware amounted to 8,970 points while that on
software counted 40,547 points. The ratio was 18.1%
: 81.8%. The ratio of sponsor commercials to spot
commercials was 42.9% : 57.1%. It is observed that
the T.V. programs sponsored by SCE were more
frequented, compared to the past three years, because
sponsors began to recognize the influence of PS over
T.V. viewers.
4  Competition under the Oligopolistic Market
After the rapid inroads of PS in the T.V. game
market, it was forming a tripartite oligopolistic
condition by SCE, Nintendo and Sega. It should be
noted that no matter how sophisticated consoles may
be, there was the case that some were out of sales in
almost one year after they were launched. (See Table
3: T. V. Video Game Hardware from the Second Half
of the 1980s to the End of the 1990s)
These included 3 DO REAL (Matsushita), PC-FX
(NEC), and PIPIN AT MARK (Bandai). The number
of these machines which were sold in the market
domestically as well as overseas did not reach up to
1.5 million. None of them survived for even two years.
With reference to 3 DO REAL, The main reason
of failure could be attributed to awkward marketing
strategy. At first, the price of 3 DO REAL was set at
79,800 yen, but, it was by far more expensive by
50,000 yen, compared to Super Family Computer. The
price was reset at 54,800 yen. but it could be hardly
regarded as affordable by parents no matter how lush
the appearance. Furthermore, 3 DO REAL was
channeled to the local chain-stores which were
franchised with Matsushita. The number of stores was
more than 30,000 in Japan. However, the shop owners
had so poor knowledge of handling 3 DO REAL that
they could neither impress nor attract potential
customers. In particular, the concept of 3 DO REAL
was so ambiguous that the shop owners considered it
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to be an IT electric appliance. 3 DO REAL was
doomed to be short-lived.
With regard to PC-FX, the machine was as popular
as PS and Sega Saturn. It enjoyed a good reputation
with consumers. However, the number of game
software was so limited that players were disappointed.
Killer game software was not produced. The machine
was only attractive to the game nerds who contributed
to creating small market share.
With respect to PIPIN AT MARK, Bandai
affiliated itself with Apple Computer. The machine
was multifunctional-oriented, covering internet, email
and word processor. However, it was a bit clumsy for
players to handle. Moreover, the size was relatively
bigger than that of machines from other companies. It
did not look compact and portable. As a result, it did
not sell well.
In sum, it can be assumed that the consoles of even
leading IT manufacturing companies could not survive
in the fierce market. These failures remain a big lesson
for the T.V. game industry.
Ⅳ  Overseas Business of SCE
1  Swift maneuverability
In November 1993, SCE was incorporated in
Japan. In May 1994, the PS project commenced at
Sony Interactive Entertainment Inc., which is located
in San Francisco. And in September 1995, PS was
marketed in the U.S. In the case of Europe, on January
1995, the PS project was set up by London Electric
Publishing Inc., which belonged to a Sony overseas
Table 3
T.V. Video Game Hardware from the Second Half of the 1980s to the End of the 1990s
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subsidiary. Not long before, SCEE (Sony Computer
Entertainment Europe) was incorporated in London.
Subsequently, distributing companies were set up in
Paris, Milan, Madrid, and Dusseldorf.
This extraordinaily rapid business deployment of
Sony gives us an important lesson because the existing
theory of multinational corporations is presupposed
on an evolutionary process of organizations as shown
in Chart 4. It usually takes quite a long time before
companies become multi-nationalized. It can be
assumed that IT-based companies, which are
especially concerned with software business are forced
to build their overseas subsidiaries a few years after
they are established in the home country because of
cut-throat competition based on rapidly ever-changing
technological innovation. It appears that an old tactical
maxim works in this industry: “quick and rough-hewn
work is better than polished but slow.”
2  Global System
When PS was launched in Japan, every part of PS
was mostly furnished through subcontract suppliers
in Japan. PS was assembled in the Kisarazu factory
50 miles south east of Tokyo, located in Tokyo Bay.
Overseas CD-ROM production for foreign
customers was made in the two subsidiaries of SME
located in Indiana and New Jersey, and a SME
affiliated company established in Salzburg, Austria.
When CD-ROM game software originally made for
Japanese customers, was also in high demand
overseas, only the master version copy was taken by
SCE staff to either the plants in the U.S. or Austria for
duplication on mass production line after it was
translated in Japan to the local languages.
Moreover, SCE positively affiliated itself with
overseas leading third parties like Electronic Arts.
Local game software manufacturing companies
willingly capitalized on offers from SCE because PS
was undeniably a lucrative machine. The video
software was locally produced and distributed in the
local channels licensed by SCE because overseas third
parties had no self-owned distributing channels.
PS was imported from Japan by air or ship. Air
freight was made when the demand was high and
shipment is urgent. The overseas price reduction of
PS was simultaneously made irrespective of any region
in wake of that in Japan. Otherwise, the speculative
spread would be yielded if trading companies buy up
PS for profit margins worldwide.
However, SCE was reluctant to distribute PS in
China and South East Asian countries because the copy
rights of PS were frequently infringed and pirated
versions of PS were published without any legal
authorization. Therefore, very restricted circulation
was made through local agencies.
3  Multi-Domestic Marketing Strategy
In terms of multinational corporations, multi-
domestic marketing strategy can be defined as an
independent marketing operation that enables overseas
subsidiaries to deploy their sales techniques at their
discretion. Multi-domestic marketing operations often
involve separate design and sales channels and
operations to best satisfy both the needs and
expectations of foreign local customers. This strategy
is often observed in the global food industry to adapt
products to their local tastes in terms of traditional
eating customs.
For this reason, it can be stated that multi-domestic
marketing strategy focuses on individual specific local
markets of foreign countries, whereas global
marketing strategy is a highly standardized marketing
operation based on the directives of headquarters
irrespective of socio-economic differences in any
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foreign country.
In the case of multi-domestic strategy in the video
game industry, it is confined to the game software
supplied to overseas markets. This strategy was strictly
controlled by every format holder. Particularly in the
early 1980s, SEGA cornered Nintendo in the U.S.,
making effective marketing measurement based on
multi-domestic strategy, whereas Nintendo had a big
lead on SEGA in the Japanese market share.
The overseas multi-domestic strategy of the video
game industry was originally formulated by Nintendo
because Nintendo was the first Japanese format holder
which advanced in the U.S. In the 1980s, Nintendo
learned to assimilate itself to the U.S. game culture
through the arcade game business in dealing with bars,
restaurants and amusement centers.
As far as the U.S. is concerned, it should be noted
that the sales number of Genesis which was called
Mega-Drive in Japan, surpassed that of S-NES which
was called Super Family Computer in Japan in 1991
at the time when Nintendo had no substantial
contenders in the Japanese market. This competitive
advantage stemmed from the multi-domestic
marketing strategy conducted by the U.S. subsidiary
of SEGA. The subsidiary distributed a killer software,
“Sonic the Hedgehog, which enthralled T.V. video
game players in the U.S. This contributed to the sales
of Genesis.
The success of video games seems to be culturally
confined to a great extent to which the content of
games must be readily understood by players in each
country. Games relating to basketball and baseball are
very popular in the U.S. ,whereas games coming from
cartoons are accepted by Japanese players. It is
interesting to note that “Dragon Quest”（ドラゴン
クエスト）, and “Sweet Reminiscence in High
School”（ときめきメモリアル）are not shipped
overseas because the contents are extremely cultural-
bounded and are therefore regarded as not well
marketable in foreign markets.
Chart 2
Accumulative Sales Amount of PlayStation
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Ⅴ  Strategic Cutting Edges
1  Value Chain
SCE had not launched any T.V. video games before
it embarked on the PS project. However, it took SCE
only about three years to take 50% market share in
the T.V. game industry. What was the source of
competitive advantage in global management in SCE?
The answer is the value chain system which enabled
SCE to implement a global strategy. (See Chart 2:
Accumulative Sales Amount of PS)
According to Michael Porter, “Value Chain
System” can be defined as every activity and
relationship of the company in order to yield its
competitive advantage in the industry. The concept is
divided into two categories: primary activities and
supporting activities, which cover suppliers, marketing
channels and consumers. (See Chart 3: Value Chain
of SCE)
Primary activities are inbound logistics, operations,
outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and services.
Primary activities are bolstered by supporting activities
such as human resource management, technology
management, purchasing and procurement throughout
the Sony groups.
It may be stated that SCE was an ideal prototype
for the concept of the value chain put forward by
Porter. In other words, it may be that the value chain
traditionally underlay the organizational climate of
SCE, which enabled its strategy to be successfully
implemented.
Sony provided SCE with many advanced
technological devices such as optical disks and mobile
terminals. Particularly, SME contributed to overseas
sales for PS because this music company took
advantage of their own marketing channels to help
the sales promotion of SCE.
In November 2003, Sony announced that it would
not make an initial public offering for SCE. It can be
presumed that Sony wanted the value chain intact,
making SCE a 100% SONY-owned subsidiary.
2  Integrated architecture
The production system of PS was based on an
integrated architecture. integrated architecture can be
defined as a configuration with multivariate interfaces
between manufacturers involved in production
concerned. integrated architecture does not to a large
Chart 3
Value Chain of SCE
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extent depend on the OEM (Original Equipment
Manufacturing) system which can be featured in
outsourcing production. Integrated architecture can be
well-observed in the relationship between set makers
and subcontract companies in the Japanese automobile
industry.(24)
In the case of the video game industry, integrated
architecture is a technological interdependence
between the format holders and the affiliated
companies and third parties. PS was not a console
produced by drawing on outsourcing contracts. SCE
itself was directly involved in the R&D, design,
merchandising, and creation marketing channel, and
customer satisfaction in cooperation with headquarters
and affiliated companies.
There is an interesting episode in relation to the
integrated architecture of the game industry. When
third party Square rescinded a contract with Nintendo
in 1996, the engineers of Nintendo, who were in charge
of the format for N64 which was to replace Super
Family Computer, renounced the concept of game soft
which the engineers of Square wanted to introduce in
the new console. Compromise between the two
companies never existed. The fissure and clash can
be traced back to the differences in the production
philosophy between integrated architecture and
modular based-architecture. While Nintendo expected
Square to do what Nintendo wanted, Square rejected
a unilateral relationship with Nintendo in the end.
With reference to Xbox which is a big challenger
to PS2, Xbox is a product of Micro Soft, a gigantic
global software company. The concept of product
stems from modular based-architecture. Modular
based architecture can be defined as a production
system depending on outsourcing covering R&D,
designing, and manufacturing, with ideas conveyed
to contracted companies. The production of Xbox is
handed over to Flextronics, which is the contract
manufacturer for Microsoft. Flextronics is a major
multinational EMS (Electric Manufacturing
companies )  a f f i l i a ted  wi th  mul t ina t iona l
manufacturers on the basis of OEM (Original
Equipment Manufacturing) contract which is closely
related to modular based production. In other words,
Microsoft took advantage of the tripartite relationship
between the modular system, EMS and OEM in order
to produce Xbox. Thus, Xbox is a product which is
predicated on the outsourcing system. It is called a
fabless（ファブレス）production system, which is
abbreviation of “fabrication less” coined for Japanese.
Xbox is assembled in Mexico, Taiwan and Austria,
whereas its design was developed and architected in
the Seattle headquarters. Takahashi put it, “Holmdahl
and his group had decided that manufacturing the
product in an area where it would be sold and could
give it cost advantage. Sony, for instance, had a tough
time replenishing supplies in the United States because
it had to use shipping lines and air freight.”(25) Thus,
Microsoft opted for a geographical advantage in terms
of cutting labor costs and marketing tactical
maneuverability.
Like PS, PS 2 was also produced on the basis of
integrated architecture in May 2000. PS2 enjoyed
MPU with 128 bytes and a DVD apparatus for replay.
LSI of PS 2 was produced in Sony’s Nagasaki Factory
in Japan. MPU is produced in the joint-venture based
factory with Toshiba which is located in the Oita
factory in Japan. The production of LSI and MPU in
the Sony group is immune to the silicon cycle which
affects the production cost of consoles.
3  Does Branding Matter?
Recently, branding management has been
attractive to scholars and business practitioners as a
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core competence of firms. A brand makes people feel
secure in purchasing. In fact, it is conceivable that this
trend can be applied to the IT industry in that value-
added strategy is closely linked to branding
management. As early as the 1990s, Intel established
a brand in the area of MPU, addressing its “Intel Inside
Campaign” to PC makers.(26)
However, as far as the game industry is concerned,
it is interesting to note that branding management does
not work in the T.V. video game industry. In order to
survive the cut-throat competitive arena of the game
industry, it is only the content of video game software
that counts most. The outcome of sales entirely rests
with how entertaining the video game software may be,
not the name of the company or the hardware per se.
There are two reasons why brand management
cannot be applied to the video game industry. The first
is that the game industry is involved in incessant price
reduction of hardware. Hardware makers hardly expect
profits from their consoles. It may be called a “gain
by losing” strategy. The second reason is that
intangible and creative characteristics inherent to video
game software may be of a matter of chance which
can be considered as a gamble and unpredictable.
These assets are prone to be transient and short-lived.
For these reasons, brand management cannot be
established in the game industry.
Ⅵ  Theoretical Implications for
       Multinational Corporations
1  Reconsideration for an evolutionary view on
multinational corporations
With reference to internalization theory, the
Reading school has greatly contributed to the
theoretical development of MNC theory since the
beginning of the 1970s. The overriding theoretical
tenet  l ies  in  the internat ional  manageria l
interdependence between the parent company and
overseas subsidiaries in order to optimize the effect
of cost reductions on their multinational behavior.
Namely, the en-meshed cross-national managerial
controls of the parent company on overseas
subsidiaries reduces transaction costs between the
headquarters and overseas subsidiaries. It is
hypothesized that an international symbiosis is a
competitive cutting edge which can fend off rivalry,
taking the form of horizontally decentralized
integrated organization.
Therefore, it is postulated that the highly
internalizing relationships between the parent
company and overseas subsidiaries is a highest stage
for global competitiveness. In fact, there are some
proponents who support the validity of an evolutionary
view on  multinational corporations.(27) (See Chart 4:
Chart 4
Evolutionary View of Multinationalization
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Evolutionary View of Multinationalization)
However, it may be that the global behavior of T.V.
video game companies may invalidate this view. As
shown in the paper, the global competitiveness of PS
stems from enmeshed networks of SCE and SONY
groups which are located in Japan, rather than resting
with overseas resources. It can be stated that the recent
experiences of Japanese T.V. game industry shows
that SCE, SEGA, and Nintendo are seldom fully multi-
nationalized through internalization as is explicated
by the Reading School.
As far as the T.V. video game industry is
concerned, overseas competitions are wholesaler-
based, which is very vulnerable to competitive
situations in the home country, while all out fierce
competitions are invariably spawned inside Japan.
Global decentralized interdependence never counts.
Industrial configuration is highly centralized. It can
be inferred that no matter how interlocked the parent
company and overseas subsidiaries may be, global
operations may be greatly disrupted if the parent
company incurs poor business achievement in Japan.
SCE shows that overseas subsidiaries had high
susceptibility to the parent company through global
competition with SEGA and Nintendo. SCE
encroached overseas operations of SEGA and
Nintendo like a blitz operation with a lightning
strategic velocity, smashing through the existing
business model of T.V. video games in Japan in the
last quarter of the 1990s.
Thus, the global success of PS put a skeptical
assumption on the view of evolutionary development
on multinational corporations, mainly based on the
internalization theory. At least, the experiences of the
Japanese T.V. video industry show us that cut-throat
domestic competitions may be a contributing factor
which is detrimental to a growing globalizing stage
of industry.
2  The Relationship between Regional Advantage
and Firm’s Competitiveness
Based on the global successful experiences of SCE,
it is supposed that regional advantage is closely related
to the value chain-based organizational structures
which are inherently established in Japan. Moreover,
the integrated architecture-based production system
may also be buttressed by the regional advantage in
which neighboring companies play a part of supporting
industry in terms of enhancing the quality of hardware
and software. In light of the T.V. video game industry,
the regional advantage is not yielded through
transaction costs in dealing with overseas subsidiaries,
as opposed to exponents who advocate the validity of
internalization theory.
It appears that as Michael Porter put it, “In
productivity competition, firms spread activities
globally to source inputs and access markets but
competitive advantage arises from a process of
innovation and productivity growth heavily localized
at the firm’s “home base” for a particular product line:
the location of its strategy development, core product
and process R&D, and critical mass of the firm’s
sophisticated production (or service technology)”(28)
Also, as Paul Krugman wrote on an industrial
accumulation in the context of economics, “The whole
process of industrialization within the United States
was marked by similar stories of small accidents
leading to the establishment of one or two persistent
centers of production. Anyone who thinks that Silicon
Valley is a distinctly modern sort of creation should
look at the fascinating monograph, ‘The Localization
of Industries,’ contained in the 1900 U.S. Census.” (29)
“Indeed, surely there is a kind of product cycle, in
which emergent new industries initially flourish in
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localized industrial districts, then disperse as they
mature.”(30)
Internalization theory does not work in the T.V.
game video industry. Intrinsic profitability does not
accrue from overseas subsidiaries. It arises from
organizational efficiency in the headquarters involving
the value chain and integrated architecture. For that
reason, it may be that there is a theoretical leeway to
be extensively re-investigated in order to further refine
internalization theory.
3  Intermediate Market
SCE hardly made use of the overseas intermediate
market, except for MPU supplied from LSI Logic, a
U.S. company. There are two factors influencing SCE
did not depend on the overseas intermediate market.
The first is that SCE did not seek for the profit from
hardware (PS). SCE regarded hardware (PS) as a
money-consuming platform for software which was
lucrative to the T.V. video game business, taking into
consideration that hardware (PS) would incur a huge
loss until it sells well in the future. Theoretically
speaking, “Internalizing internationally in SCE was
not created because the domestic production cost was
invariably and deliberately expected to exceed the
profit”, as opposed to the premise by the Reading
school maintaining that internalizing will occur when
the profit goes beyond the cost.(31)
The second factor is that software is an intangible
asset which cannot be transplanted overseas. The pro-
duction of software is a group-based work with well-
aligned division of labor in Japan. Those who must
be engaged with producing software are all Japanese
because they must frequently and coherently interact
with one another until the work is accomplished. The
process requires a laborious and subtle communica-
tion. This is another reason why the overseas inter-
mediate market for software was not established
through OEM.
Conclusion
It is summarized in this paper that the primary
success of PS lies in the two management strategic
streaks conducted by SCE: integrated architecture
which is a centripetal orientated production system
and the value chain system which encompasses SCE,
the Sony Headquarters, Sony affiliated companies and
supporting business entities. This is the management
core competence for SCE. If SCE had depended on
module architecture which is directly connected to the
outsourcing way, and unless SCE made the most of
the value chain, this company would not have won
over the T.V. video game industry. In sum, SCE
produced a win-win strategy making a good tripartite
nexus between a nucleus organization (SCE), internal
organizations (Sony groups),  and external
organizations (shop owners, distributors and the
related suppliers).
Notes
(1) Sega Enterprises changed the registered company name
to SEGA on November 2000. SEGA was consolidated
into Sammy on October 2003 because of its chronic loss
of game business.
(2) In the 1970s, some toy makers and IT manufacturers
produced T.V. video games. However,  youngsters hardly
paid attention to these machines. Production was one-
shot business based.
(3) The first prototype characteristic of the contemporary
features of T.V. video games originated from “Channel
F”,  which was produced by Fairchild in the U.S. in 1976.
See, http://www.geocities.co.jp/Playtown-King/8341/
cv.html
(4) The Atari Corporation supplied numerous poor-quality
video software to the market. The game contents were
so boring that many players were disappointed by video
games. The reaction was dreadful. The more boring
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games supplied, the less the sales of consoles produced
by Atari Corporation. The population playing video
games drastically plunged. Many game makers and game
shops crashed. This was called  “Atari Shock”.
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(12) ditto, Cristensen, p.xvii.
(13) This section draws on the site of comments on advertising
strategies of SCE at http://www.netlaputa.ne.jp/
~braumaz/game-ad/adv983-1.html
(14) The multi-platform system means that third parties can
freely contract with SEGA, Nintendo, and SCE without
being bound by any single format holder.
(15) A jingle is a short, simple tune which is used to advertise
a product on T.V.
(16) See the site at http://www.developer.com/mgmt/
article.php/3338791
(17) Ibuka Seishin Keisho Kenkyu Kai, Ibaka Masaru Goroku,
Sony Magajinzu, 1994, p.55.
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(20) Asakura, Reishi, Sony no Kakumeiji-tachi, IDG, 1998,
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general manager of marketing division, SEGA Inc.
(22) Ogawa Kousuke, Maaketingu Jyouhou Kakumei,
Yuuhikaku, 1999 p. 94.
(23) This section draws on the data issued by VIDEO
RESEARCH, a Japanese advertisement research
company. Gross Rating Point (GRP) is a unit for
indicating the total advertising exposure on viewers. It
can be said in theory that if GRP indicates 100 points, a
viewer is presupposed to have an opportunity to watch a
commericial, and it is presumed that the commercial
cannot be recognized by the viewer before GRP indicates
over 600 points. With respect to GRP used in this paper,
the calculating unit is yearly based.
(24) See Clark, K. B and Fujimoto, Takahiro, Product
Development Performance, Harvard Business School,
1991.
(25) Takahashi, Dean, Opening the Xbox, Roseville, CA:
Prima Publishing. 2002. p. 197. Todd Holmdahl was a
director of hardware design of the Xbox and at the same
time he was in charge of manufacturing logistics for the
Xbox in 2001 before the X box was released.
(26) Jackson Tim, INSIDE INTEL, Writers House Inc. 1997.
(27) See the following publications written by the exponents
espousing evolutionary views on multinational
corporations. Perlmutter. H.V., “The Tortuos Evolution
of Multinational Corporations ”, Columbia Journal of
World Business, Jan-Feb, Vol. 4. No.1. 1969. Young S.
Hamil, J. Wheeler C. Davis Jr., International Market
Entry and Development Strategies and Management,
Hermel Hempstead, 1989. McKierman, Strategies of
Growth, Routedge. 1992. Peter Buckley, Foreign Direct
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, Macmillan
Press, 1995.
(28) Michael Porter, “On Competition”, Harvard Business
Review Book, 1998 p. 323.
(29) Paul Krugman, Geography and Trade, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass. 1991. p. 61.
(30) ditto, Krugman, 1991. p. 63.
(31) See, Buckley, Peter and Casson, Mark, The Future of
Multinational Enterprise, Macmillan, 1991.
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